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Abstract 
For over two decades, scientific and political communities have debated whether and how to 
act on climate change. The present paper revisits these debates and synthesizes the long-
standing arguments. Firstly, it provides an overview of the development of international 
climate policy and discusses clashing positions represented by sceptics and supporters of 
action on climate change. Secondly, it discusses the market-based measures as a means to 
increase the win-win opportunities and to attract profit-minded investors to invest in climate 
change mitigation. Finally, the paper examines whether climate protection policies can yield 
benefits both for the environment and the economy. The paper suggests the possibility of 
building environmental and climate policies around development priorities that are vitally 
important for developing countries and stresses the need for using sustainable development 
as a framework for climate change policies. 
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The Great Climate Debate –  
A Developing Country Perspective 
 
B. Sudhakara Reddy and Gaudenz B. Assenza 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of climate change continues to be hotly contested, but much of the disagreement 
has shifted from the scientific certainty of climate change to identifying appropriate policy 
responses
1. The debate centres on the causes and consequences of climate change, what, if 
anything should be done to mitigate the emissions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
particularly with respect to factors such as population and economic growth, and energy use.  
While most scientists agree that there is a significant human influence on the climate, there is 
still a legitimate debate regarding the quantity, time and place of these effects.  Most 
scientists argue that human economic activity is the main reason for global warming and the 
Earth's average temperature will rise between 5 and 10 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 
century or two. Some insist that the observed warming is not a trend into the future, but 
merely a sign of natural climate variability. According to them, global warming is not an 
urgent problem in the distant future and even if it were, the cost of prevention and 
remediation is too high.  There is a third theory too:  human civilization has existed during a 
climatic anomaly--over 10,000 years of relatively stable and warm climate. Normally, the 
earth's climate over millions of years is much more unstable and, on average, somewhat 
cooler. Prof. Richard Alley of the Pennsylvania State University believes that the ice core 
records show that huge shifts have happened in the climate--not over centuries or even 
decades, but over years. This means that we could face a change of 10 - 20 degrees 
Fahrenheit over a few years. We could settle into a new ice age, or end up warmer still. We 
are likely to be better off in the warmer world than in the colder, since an ice age is a tough 
environment in which to feed more than 6 billion people. 
  So, according to scenario I, there is a possibility of experiencing a gradual warming of 
5 - 10 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century which could be highly disruptive, especially 
to agriculture and human health. Hence, we should take drastic steps immediately to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  If the second theory is right, there is little cause for concern, since 
what we are experiencing is just a modest blip and will return to stability. If the third scenario 
                                                 
1
 The U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change along with Al Gore won the 2007 Nobel Peace 
Prize.   4
is correct, then we will be experiencing an era of unstable climate extremes. However, one 
thing is certain. We need to watch the indicators of climate change carefully, and there is an 
urgent need to improve our climate science and modeling.  This would require the 
enhancement of our knowledge on (i) the reliability of the temperature measurements, (ii) the 
quantum of impacts and (iii) impacts in different regions so that we can focus on remedial 
measures.    
  In the debate on climate change mitigation, we can distinguish two main groups, 
which may be referred to as skeptics and supporters
2. While the skeptics generally do not 
want to take action or want to postpone measures on climate change, the supporters claim that 
action is needed right now. The categorization into two groups is a simplified one because 
there is quite a significant variation within these broad camps. Another key issue in the 
debate on climate change is the costs of climate change itself.  Supporters fear that the 
environmental and socio-economic costs of climate change are significantly high while the 
skeptics are more fearful of the economic consequences of trying to avoid climate change.  In 
contrast to the ‘no-rush’ approach advocated by skeptics, the supporters believe that the cost 
of delay is much higher than one of immediate action. When it comes to detailed calculations 
of the cost of climate change mitigation, skeptics sometimes use worst case assumptions, 
which exclude partially or completely, the use of market-based mechanisms and ‘no-regrets’ 
options. Supporters believe that there are significant opportunities in almost every country to 
achieve climate change mitigation at a zero or negative net economic cost.  
  With respect to policy responses three types can be distinguished.  The first is focused 
intervention to minimize the negative impacts on the environment. An important 
consideration is to ‘avoid cures that may be worse than the disease’. The second is 
adaptation, which some economists prefer because the measures are taken in the future, and 
because their discounted present cost is lower. This policy is controversial, however, because 
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 It can be argued that it is problematic to use the categorization of sceptics and supporters because it is too 
difficult to capture the complexity of the issue and the diversity of viewpoints by categorizing the debate 
into two camps. This caveat is important, but it is equally valid to argue that even very differentiated views 
on climate change will ultimately have to decide upon basic dualistic questions that divide sceptics and 
supporters, such as whether climate change is influenced by human activities (yes/no), whether climate 
change will have serious impacts in the future (yes/no), whether governments shall spend money on 
avoiding climate change (yes/no), and so on. The answers to such questions determine which basic category 
the respondent belongs to, which still allows for the fact that there can be significant variation within each 
category. 
   5
it does not prevent or mitigate climate change. The third is prevention. This is promoted 
mainly by environmentalists, and requires immediate investments to prevent future damages. 
  From a developing country perspective, addressing climate change issue poses a 
fundamentally different challenge.  For these countries, emission reduction is not a priority in 
the near term. With income levels far below those of developed countries and per capita 
emissions of one-sixth of those of the industrialized world, developing countries have to 
strive for economic growth and a better quality of life.  This may lead to claims in some 
quarters that developing countries are increasing their share of global emissions. It is 
important to know that many of their efforts are towards economic development and poverty 
alleviation and energy security.  Put it differently, these are multiple drivers for actions that 
reduce emissions and they produce multiple benefits. The most promising policy approaches, 
then, will be those that capitalize on natural synergies between development priorities and 
climate protection which simultaneously advance both these efforts.   
The goal of this paper is to demystify the climate issue and view it from a developing 
country perspective. This is due to the fact that the most vulnerable are the developing 
countries  because their adaptive capacity is less than those of developed countries 
(vulnerability changes with population and economic growth, and technological progress). 
This will enable the reader to participate fully in one of the most important debates of our 
time. 
 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CLIMATE POLICY 
The question of how climate change might affect human activities appeared on the 
international agenda in 1979 at the World Climate Conference (WCC).
3
  The conference 
issued a declaration calling on the world’s governments ‘(…) to foresee and prevent potential 
man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.’
4
 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘climate change’ is preferable to ‘global warming’. The latter refers to the observed heating of the 
Earth's atmosphere; whereas ‘climate change’ refers to a broader set of alterations in climate patterns, which 
include warming as well as cooling trends and other meteorological changes. Although some of the changes 
could be explained as natural climate variability, there is an increasing scientific consensus that climate 
change in recent history has been increasingly caused by human activities, including the burning of fossil 
fuels, deforestation, and industrial activities such as cement production. These and other anthropogenic 
activities result in the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) including carbon dioxide (CO2), 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), and water vapour. Of these gases, 
carbon dioxide accounts for more than 90 percent of GHG emissions. About three quarters of annual CO2 
emissions result from burning fossil fuels including coal, oil, and natural gas (IEA 1997). 
4
 UNEP and UNFCCC 2002, Information Sheet 17.   6
Following this conference, it took many years with further meetings and initiatives before the 
international community was able to agree on initial steps to deal with the problem.
5
 In 1988, 
UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with the mandate ‘(…) to assess on a 
comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-
economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human induced 
climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.’
6
 
The IPCC is a scientific body that includes 2,500 scientists including eight Nobel 
Laureates. Since its establishment, the Panel released four Assessment Reports
7 in 1990, 
1995,  2001 and 2007 (released recently), which summarized the state of scientific 
knowledge available at that time. These reports formulated a consensus opinion while 
pointing to areas that are uncertain or controversial and need further research. In its ‘First 
Assessment Report’ released in 1990, the Panel expressed concerns about the growing 
evidence for a human impact on climate change.
8
  The report was influential for the 
development of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which was adopted at the Earth Summit in 1992.
9
 In this non-binding document, 154 
countries, plus the European Community, agreed on the ‘(…) stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.’
10
 To achieve this goal, the countries were divided into 
two groups: the developed (Annex I) countries were encouraged to cut their emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) back to 1990 levels, while the remaining countries did not have to 
commit to such reductions, following a principle of ‘(…) common but differentiated 
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 According to UNEP and UNFCCC (2002), the key events were the Villach Conference (October 1985), 
the Toronto Conference (June 1988), the Ottawa Conference (February 1989), the Tata Conference 
(February 1989), the Hague Conference (March 1989), the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference (November 
1989), the Cairo Compact (December 1989), the Bergen Conference (May 1990), and the Second World 
Climate Conference (November 1990). 
6
 IPCC 2003. 
7
 It is currently finalizing its Fourth Assessment Report "Climate Change 2007", also referred to as AR4. 
8
 Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990. 
9
 The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994, 90 days after the receipt of the 50th instrument of 
ratification (see UNEP and UNFCCC 2002). An international convention must be ratified by national 
parliaments in order to be valid under national law. 
10
 UNFCCC, Article 2   7
responsibilities (…).’
11
  In practice, differentiated responsibilities meant that developed 
countries were obliged to assume leadership in efforts to mitigate climate change.
12
 
Another significant tenet in the UNFCCC is the precautionary principle.
13
 Article 3 of the 
Convention describes the notion as follows: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures.’
14
 Science may never be able to predict exactly what will happen and where, but it 
can ‘(…) provide scenarios and assess the probabilities and consequences of various plausible 
alternatives.’
15
 According to the precautionary principle, policy decisions must be made under 
uncertainty when there is a risk of catastrophic damage. Also the precautionary principle 
suggests that many segments of the private sector may be better off, if serious costs are 
avoided by adopting precautionary measures.  
The development of the UNFCCC and other international environmental treaties was 
accompanied by the establishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a joint 
venture of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank. For the past twelve years, the GEF 
has been one of the main sources of international funding for clean energy and other 
measures to address climate change. The GEF does not implement environmental projects 
itself, but it provides grants and concessional funds for projects. Apart from climate change, 
the GEF also funds projects in areas such as biological diversity, international waters, and the 
depletion of the ozone layer.  
The purpose of the GEF is to fund reduction and adaptation measures both in 
countries in transition and in developing countries.
16
 Since its establishment in 1991, GEF 
has allocated more than $6 billion in grants and mobilized a further $12 billion in co-
financing. So far, more than 1,800 projects have been supported by the GEF in transition 
economies and in developing countries. The GEF is supported by a large number of 
governments, which have replenished the funds every three to four years. In August 2002, 
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 UNFCCC, Article 3 
12
 This is the first of five guiding principles laid down in Article 3 of the UNFCCC. 
13
 The precautionary principle is also discussed in Section 12.2.2. 
14
 UNFCCC, Article 3  
15
 Schneider and Rickel, not dated. 
16
 Martinot and McDoom 2000, 16.   8
almost $3 billion were pledged to finance GEF activities until 2006.
17
 Although $3 billion is a 
significant sum, it translates to less than $1 billion a year, which is spread across many 
countries and multiple environmental problems. To assess the level of funding, compare $1 
billion, for example, to $80 billion provided by the US Congress in March 2003 as a first 
installment for the war in Iraq. In light of the scale and severity of global environmental 
problems, GEF funds by themselves cannot make a major difference. Since it is unlikely that 
governments will dramatically increase their allocations for the global environment in the 
foreseeable future, greater priority must be placed on devising ways to mobilize private 
capital to complement public funding. 
At the Rio meeting, a process was put in place to strengthen the regime over time. The 
participants agreed that the supreme decision making body of the UNFCCC, the Conference 
of the Parties (COP), would meet regularly to discuss further steps to mitigate climate 
change. At its first session, which took place in Berlin in 1995, the COP concluded that the 
1992 UNFCC commitments were insufficient and that there was a need to establish 
compulsory targets. In December 1995, just in time for COP2, the IPCC released its ‘Second 
Assessment Report’, which was written and reviewed by about 2,000 scientists. The Report 
reaffirmed that ‘(…) the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human 
influence on the global climate.’ The report also noted ‘(…) the availability of so-called no-
regrets options and other cost-effective strategies for combating climate change.’
18
 
The confirmation of the evidence on climate change galvanized policy makers into action. 
The Kyoto Protocol
19
 was adopted  on 11
th December 1997 at the COP3. The Protocol for the 
first time set legally binding emissions targets for a group of countries listed in Annex I. In 
Article 3 of the Protocol, Annex I countries commit to reduce their emissions of GHGs by at 
least five percent below the 1990 level by the years 2008–2012.
20
 Individual commitments 
differ from this guideline in both directions. The 5 percent group target would be achieved 
through the following cuts: 
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 GEF, not dated. 
18
 UNEP and UNFCCC 2002, Information Sheet 17. 
19
 The full name is The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
20
 Emission reductions need not be achieved by a fixed year, but the average of the commited five-year period 
will determine whether the Kyoto targets are achieved.   9
1.  Eight percent by Switzerland, most Central and Eastern European states, and the 
European Union. The EU will meet its group target by distributing different rates 
among its member states; 
2.  Seven percent by the US which in 2001 withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol; and  
3.  Six percent by Canada, Hungary, Japan, and Poland.  
In contrast, Russia, New Zealand, and Ukraine are to stabilize their emissions, while 
Norway may increase emissions by up to 1 percent, Australia by up to 8 percent, and Iceland 
by up to 10 percent.
21
 T he Kyoto Protocol focuses on six GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). These gases are to be combined in a basket, with reductions in 
each gas translated into CO2 equivalents that are then added up to produce a single figure.
 22
 
According to Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol, the agreement becomes valid ‘(…) on the 
ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating 
Annex I Parties, which account for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions 
for 1990 from that group, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession ’[UNFCC, 2003]. In March 2001, the United States, which represents 
about one quarter of global carbon dioxide emissions, withdrew from the Protocol.  As of 
June 2007, 172 Parties had signed and ratified or acceded to the Kyoto Protocol. With the 
United States’ withdrawal, Russia’s ratification became pivotal for reaching the 55 percent 
threshold for bringing the Protocol into force. 
The ‘Third Assessment Report’, which was published in 2001, reported the findings 
from three task forces: Working Group I dealt with the evidence on climate change, Working 
Group II focused on possible consequences, and Working Group III examined mitigation 
options. The models of Working Group I found that in the course of the 20
th century ‘globally 
averaged surface temperatures’ have risen 0.6°C, with a margin of error of ± 0.2°C. 
According to the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES), the globally averaged 
surface air temperature is projected to increase between 1.4°C and 5.8°C by 2100 relative to 
1990 levels.
23
  The Working Group II identified different scenarios for the potential 
consequences that could follow from the range of projected increases in temperature. It also 
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 A list of reduction commitments of the parties can be found in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. 
22
 The concept Global Warming Potential (GWP) is used to calculate CO2 equivalents according to the IPCC 
methodology (see IPCC 1995). 
23
 IPCC 2001b.   10
presented the consensus of the group as to their level of confidence with its predictions. The 
Working Group II confirmed that overall harmful impacts of climate change are likely to 
overshadow positive impacts. One prediction is that, as a result of the melting of the polar 
icecaps, the volume of the world’s oceans will increase, probably somewhere between 0.09 
and 0.88 metres by 2100.
24
 The result could be coastal flooding that may dislocate up to 
several hundred million people worldwide. 
Other possible consequences of climate change include more frequent and extreme 
weather-related events such as heat waves, droughts, fires, floods, and storms, which could 
damage economies and result in negative impacts on human health. The scientists in Working 
Group II note that a rise ‘(…) in the frequency or intensity of heat waves will increase the 
risk of mortality and morbidity, principally in older age groups and the urban poor (high 
confidence) (…) .Any regional increases in climate extremes (storms, floods, cyclones, etc.) 
associated with climate change would cause physical damage, population displacement, and 
adverse effects on food production, freshwater availability and quality, and would increase 
the risks of infectious disease epidemics, particularly in developing countries (very high 
confidence/well-established).’
25
 While shifting climate zones could exacerbate food 
shortages, climate change could also bring localized benefits to some regions, for example 
the potential to grow wheat in Siberia.  
Working Group III, which assesses various climate change mitigation options, 
concluded that a wide range of policy instruments should be considered in order to stimulate 
participation of various stakeholders in climate change mitigation. Firms and financial 
institutions are among the main stakeholders to be targeted by policy measures. The IPCC 
experts believe that a broad selection of instruments enlarges the number of no regrets
 options 
and help to fit policies to short-, medium-, and long-term goals (IPCC, 1995). The Working 
Group estimated that about half of the total GHG emission reductions attained by 2020 could 
be profitable, based on discount rates ranging from five to 12 percent, which are in line with 
public sector discount rates.
26
 At the same time, it notes that ‘Private internal rates of return 
vary greatly, and are often significantly higher, affecting the rate of adoption of these 
technologies by private entities.’
27
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 IPCC 2001b. 
25
 IPCC 2001c. [chapter 2.2.2 page 2] 
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 Public sector discount rates are controversial in the climate area. 
27
 IPCC 2001a. [   11
The third volume of the fourth assessment report of the IPCC has been approved on 
4
th May 2007. According to the report, between 1970 and 2004, global emissions of CO2, 
CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6, weighted by their global warming potential (GWP), have 
increased by 70%, from 28.7 to 49 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents. The largest 
growth in global GHG emissions has come from the energy supply sector (an increase of 
145%), transport  120%, industry 65% and land use, land use change, and forestry 40%.  A 
range of policies, including those on climate change, energy security8, and sustainable 
development, have been effective in reducing GHG emissions in different sectors and in 
many countries. The scale of such measures, however, has not yet been large enough to 
counteract the global growth in emissions. The report
28 is a consensus document put together 
by 600 scientists and agreed by representatives of 113 countries, predicts continued warming 
of 0.2 °C per decade for the coming few decades. Over the twenty-first century it predicts a 
range of 1.1-2.9 °C warming in a scenario with low emissions of greenhouse gases, and 2.4 ─ 
6.4 °C in a high-emissions scenario. The warming is expected to be the greatest over land, 
and the chance of heat wave increasing in frequency is greater than 90%
29. 
3. CLASHING POSITIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
3.1 Sceptics 
The sceptics include, at one extreme, those who see climate change as a hoax inflated by 
media and who maintain that the only sensible solution is to do nothing. According to the 
supporters they misjudge the risks of climate change by making selective use of evidence. 
Backed by the fossil fuel lobby and its allies in the media, they endeavour to deflect attention 
from the emerging consensus in the scientific community. However, not all sceptics can be 
described as extreme and not everyone serves as a mouthpiece for the fossil fuel lobby. There 
are other groups of sceptics who do not discount the possibility of serious consequences of 
climate change, but who believe that the cost of taking action now is higher than that of not 
taking action. One prominent sceptic, Wilfred Beckerman, expressed this position when he 
claimed that ‘Global warming is no cause for alarm or dramatic action. If dramatic action 
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 The Report provides an overall scientific view on climate change that integrates and synthesizes 
information from the three volumes around 6 topic areas that include: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability 
and mitigation of climate change 
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were taken, the effects on human welfare would be horrendous – even more horrendous 
perhaps than the effects of global warming itself.’
30
 
In 1995 the Leipzig Declaration on Global Climate Change was signed by about one 
hundred scientists, stating that ‘Costly actions undertaken to reduce greenhouse emissions are 
not justified by the available scientific evidence.’
31
 Since climate modelling is not always 
precise, sceptics argue that it cannot serve as a basis for strong policy measures. John Christy, 
a professor of atmospheric science at the University of Alabama, notes that ‘Reports are filled 
with ifs, maybes and coulds. What we do know is that the climate varies naturally.’
32
 
Often the disbelief in climate science is rooted within a scepticism of the 
environmental movement – a reaction against inroads made by environmental ideas into 
mainstream policy. Mary Hager describes the lingering doubts about the conventional 
wisdom among those individuals who disagree with the general scientific consensus about the 
environment: ‘What if global warming does not loom on the horizon, or if seasonal 
stratospheric ozone layer depletion is part of a natural cycle and not the creation of human 
created chemicals? What if pesticides really promote a more abundant and varied food supply 
for the world without causing cancer and ail in children? Or if hazards from abandoned 
wastes have been blown out of proportion?’
33
 
While a wing of sceptics claim that global warming merely is a figment of 
imagination, more moderate groups recognize that there has been a warming trend and that 
this trend is likely to continue into the future. Some sceptics acknowledge that, based on the 
cumulative evidence, there could be serious consequences in the long run. Still, they argue 
that predictions about future warming and the consequences associated with climate change 
are often exaggerated, and that the GHG theory is not the only plausible explanation of 
observed warming trends. For example, James Hansen, Makiko Sato, and Reto Ruedy argue 
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that too much emphasis has been placed on carbon dioxide, but they do not discount the 
possibility that carbon dioxide is an important contributing cause to climate change.
34
 
The more research is conducted, the easier it becomes to support any position with 
evidence. Sceptics can point to an increasing number of studies on global warming that are 
inconclusive, while avoiding or disparaging conclusive studies. The moderates within the 
spectrum of sceptics are careful not to dismiss well-established facts, so as not to lose 
credibility. However, they emphasize evidence that undermines the impetus for policy action, 
and they point to real or perceived weaknesses in the research of their opponents. The 
European Science & Environment Forum for instance states that ‘Solar output and sunspot 
activity could well have played a major role in climate change as observed over the last 
century’
35
, adding that there is a lack of ‘(…) firm geological evidence to support global 
warming.’
36
 Another sceptic, Patrick Michaels, explains the extremely hot summer of 1998 as 
‘(…) the result of a strong El Nino superimposed on a decade in which temperature continues 
to reflect a warming that largely took place in the first half of this century.’
37
 In a 
congressional testimony, Michaels argued that future warming would be ‘(…) relatively 
modest (…)’
38
 and that forecasts of future impacts on ‘(…) ecosystems, health and the 
economy are based on old models which are in error.’
39
 
Academic sceptics are supported by activists in anti-environmental groups. Jim Baca 
describes the movement ‘People for the West!’, whose members are engaged in grassroots 
mobilization by going door to door with petitions in rural and minority communities in the 
United States, by calling people, and by writing letters.
40
 According to Michael Bruner and 
Max Oelschlaeger, sceptics are successful due to ‘(…) their ability to articulate persuasive 
rationales through slogans, myths and narratives.’
41
 These narratives are disseminated 
through friendly media. Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew Center, a climate change 
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 Baca 1995, 54. 
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research institute, argues that the Wall Street Journal is an influential source of such myths. 
To illustrate her point, Claussen cites following from the Wall Street Journal:
42
 
Why require the nations of this planet to spend the hundreds of billions of dollars 
necessary to reduce carbon dioxide and other emissions when we don't even know if 
the earth’s climate is getting permanently hotter or if that temperature change is 
caused by human activity or if that change is even dangerous? 
Sceptics base their arguments on different estimates of the cost of compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol. They point to pessimistic scenarios, such as the one developed by the Energy 
Information Administration, which showed that it would cost the United States 4.2 percent of 
GDP to comply with Kyoto.  They suggest to postpone action until there is greater certainty 
about the causes and consequences of climate change. They argue that it makes no sense to 
rush for ‘short-term’ Kyoto targets, and that it is better to wait until the market itself will 
force out carbon-intensive fossil fuels and will favour the use of more environmentally 
friendly fuels and energy efficient technologies.
43
 Some scientists insist on letting the process 
of GHG emissions stabilization last for about one hundred years. In their opinion such an 




Sceptics and lobbyists who strive to prevent action on climate change further are 
supported by groups in academia and in think tanks such as the Cato Institute, the Heritage 
Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute. Together with lobby organizations such as 
the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), this network develops the intellectual foundation for 




Much is at stake. A transition to renewable forms of energy and greater energy efficiency 
would make industries and markets react. The countries of OPEC (Organisation for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) stand to lose most from the commercialization of clean 
energy technologies.
46
 Apart from a loss of revenue due to expanding alternative energy 
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45
 The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) was one of the most outspoken and confrontational industry groups 
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markets, the Kyoto sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance could lead to a welfare 
decrease in the OPEC region.
47
  
The Little Ice Age and the Medieval Warming that preceded it from 950 to 1300 AD 
stand out in every temperature record as the major weather events of the last 1,000 years, 
and they're a hefty problem for global warming advocates. If the world was warmer in 
1200 AD than today, and far colder in the year 1400, why would we blame current 
temperatures trends on auto exhausts?
48 
Most scientists prefer to stay out of the politically charged ‘Greenhouse Wars’
49
, which 
are less about science than about the quest for economic power. But it is difficult to avoid 
getting drawn into the battle. Many sceptics appear comfortable in the dual role of scientists 
and advocates, and also supporters realize that unless they become effective advocates, they 
can easily be ‘(…) over-ruled by governments as a result of heavy pressure from the OPEC 
countries and the Global Climate Coalition.
50
 The main problem, however, is of economic 





Many supporters of action on climate change agree with sceptics that the climate is 
influenced by multiple contributing factors, including natural causes. Without adopting a 
mono-causal point of view, many supporters nonetheless argue that the theory of human 
influence on the climate is well established. They also believe that many consequences of 
climate change, although not certain, are documented so well already that it would be 
irresponsible to wait with action. Hence the main issue for supporters is not whether to do 
something about climate change, but what to do about the problem. 
The debate centres on the effectiveness, cost, and ethical appropriateness of various 
courses of action.
52
 While some supporters favour command and control mechanisms, such as 
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for example regulated limits on GHG emissions, others would like to rely on economic 
instruments, such as for instance carbon taxes and market-based mechanisms such as 
emission trading. There is much debate on the role of the private sector in problem solving. 
Some believe that the private sector is crucial for any solution, while others question the 
motives of private actors. Many supporters agree that civil society should play a role in 
problem solving as well. And some argue that lasting solutions to environmental problems 




While some pessimists claim that it is already too late to take effective action on 
climate change, the majority argues that it is not too late to mitigate future damages. 
Supporters believe that if nothing is done, serious consequences are unavoidable, including 
rising sea levels, more extreme weather events, disruption of agriculture, and impaired health. 
All of this could lead to major reductions in economic well-being and quality of life.
54
 
To support their call for action, supporters refer to evidence of serious impacts.  A 
report prepared by Innovest for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) shows 
that banks, insurances, and other businesses have incurred significant losses due to climate 
change already, and that these losses will likely multiply if global warming is left unchecked. 
The report notes that global economic damages associated with natural catastrophes have 
approximately doubled every ten years, reaching almost $1 trillion in the course of the past 
15 years. Annual weather-related disasters have quadrupled compared to 40 years ago; and 
insurance payouts have increased by a factor of 11, rising to an average $10 billion annually 
during the 1990s. If we extrapolate these trends into the future, yearly losses will increase to 
almost $150 billion in the next decade.
55
 Table 1 lists the number of great weather-related 
disasters and the increase of economic and insured losses in the period from 1950 until 2001. 
Based on the numbers shown in Table 1, pessimists among the supporters claim that the 
reduction of greenhouse gases will not always bring the intended results. For example, there 
may be little improvement with regard to the decline of forest areas or the number of malaria 
incidences, which are key areas of concern in relation to anthropogenic warming.
56
 However, 
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the possibility that reducing GHG emissions will not lead to rapid results cannot be used as 
an argument that nothing should be done. The key issue is the uncertainty about the 
absorption capacity of ecological systems and the threshold at which such systems collapse. 
Richard Dorf argues that ‘(…) climate change on top of the other environmental problems 
may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, particularly with respect to forests, 





















41.2 54.1 79.4 126.1 425.4  362
Insured losses 
(US $bn) 
- 7.2 11.5 23 98.9  79.3
Source:  Innovest 2002a, 7 and MunichRe,  2004 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the steeply increasing cost curve, which is believed to be, at least 
partly, related to climate change. The figure depicts the economic and insured losses and 
some of the projections and risks associated with climate change and their impacts on the 
ecosystem and human activity.  However, care should be taken to correctly estimate the rate 
and scale of these losses since it may result in either too little attention and significant human 
costs or too much cost for unneeded preventative measures.  Figure 2 shows the trend in 
annual frequency of great natural catastrophes during 1950 and 2004 which enables to 
understand the type of hazard and estimates the number of people that might suffer 
consequences.  The results can be used to determine options for reducing or eliminating risks. 
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Figure 1: Trend in economic and insured losses, 1950-2004 
Source:  MunichRe, 2004 
 
 
Figure 2:  Trend in annual frequency of great natural catastrophes, 1950-2004 
(Source:  MunichRe,  2004)   19
Table 2 shows the impacts of sea level rise on South Asian countries, those with dense 
population. According to the table, the impacts of sea level rise are smaller than worldwide. 
 
Table 2: Impacts of sea level rise 
Impacts of sea level rise: South Asia 
  1m 2m  3m 4m 5m 
Area (Total = 4,197,171 sq.km.) 
Impacted  area  12,362 21,983 35,696  52,207  69,225 
% of total area  0.29  0.52  0.85  1.24  1.65 
Population (Total = 1,306,556,000) 
Impacted  population  5,870,427 10,187,694 17,810,069  22,065,103  39,505,521 
% of total population  0.45  0.78  1.36  1.69  3.02 
GDP (Total = 3,295,567 million USD) 
Impacted GDP (USD)  18,021  30,957  52,036  72,462  94,020 
% of  total GDP  0.55  0.94  1.58  2.20  2.85 
Urban extent (Total = 241,779 sq.km.) 
Impacted  area  809 1,379 2,311  3,599  5,117 
% of total area  0.33  0.57  0.96  1.49  2.12 
Agricultural extent (Total = 3,023,617 sq.km.) 
Impacted area  3,442  6,951  13,501  23,716  35,190 
% of total area  0.11  0.23  0.45  0.78  1.16 
Wetlands area (Total = 579,130 sq.km.) 
Impacted  area  9,184 16,685 25,988  36,109  46,003 
% of total area  1.59  2.88  4.49  6.24  7.94 
 Source: Dasgupta et al, 2007. 
 
Table 3: Projected climate change impacts compared to other environmental problems 
Impact / effect  Climate-
sensitive     
sector / indicator 
Year 
Baseline (includes impacts 
of environmental problems 
other than climate change) 




2060 for baseline. 
> 2100 for 
climate change 
Must increase 83 %,  
Relative to 1990 
Net global production would change  –2.4 % 
to +1.1 %; but could substantially redistribute 




2050  Decrease 25-30 (+) %, 
relative to 1990 







25 to 40 million additional cases 
50 to 80 million additional cases 




< 25 cm  
< 50 cm  
Extreme 
weather events 
2060 or 2100  Not applicable  Unknown whether magnitudes or frequencies 
of occurrence will increase or decrease 
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Table 3 provides information on climate change impacts vis-à-vis other environmental 
problems such as public healh under the baseline conditions in the 2060s. (i.e., in the absence 
of global warming).  Agriculture production will decline significantly and the population at 
risk of malaria might increase. Thus, the impacts of climate change into the foreseeable are 
secondary to the impacts of other agents of climate change built into the base line.  
 
3.3  Analysing Issues:  Sceptics vs. Supporters 
If one compares the arguments of sceptics with those of supporters, one finds little common 
ground. In what follows, five issues will be analyzed to show how supporters differ from 
sceptics.  
 
 (i) Scientific knowledge:  In general sceptics and supporters agree that there is a need for 
more knowledge on climate change, but they disagree on how much certainty is achieved 
already, and how much is needed. Supporters believe that there is a sufficient basis of 
established facts to justify measures on climate change now. George Marshall argues that 
waiting for a complete scientific understanding will not be accepted as an excuse by future 
generations affected by global warming. Moreover, he states that ‘(…) there is far more 
certainty about climate change than there is about many other aspects of science on which 
policy decisions are routinely made’.
59
 Sceptics and supporters concur on the need to improve 
models designed to predict the course and consequences of climate change. 
(ii) Alternative explanations of climate change:  Supporters are not convinced about most 
alternative explanations of observed warming trends forwarded by sceptics. For example, 
supporters argue that there are not sufficient data to support the conclusion that the warming 
is due to sunspot activity, since satellite monitoring of the sun started not until the late 
1970s.
60
 They also point out that the warming cannot be explained by long run fluctuations, 
as suggested by this theory, the world would currently be in a cooling phase. They recall that 
in the 1970s, some scientists were concerned about the prospect of global cooling. 
(iii) The precautionary principle:  Supporters advocate the application of the precautionary 
principle. This principle is considered necessary for environmental and health damage 
prevention in a forward looking society. The precautionary principle was first applied in 
Germany in the 1970s. Later on, it was incorporated into international agreements, including 
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the Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development and the UNFCCC. In January 1998, the 
Wingspread Conference on the precautionary principle concluded that ‘(…) if a practice 
seems likely to harm the environment, even if proof of harm is not definitive, actions should 
be taken to eliminate or control the practice.’
61
 In the words of Raffensperger and Tickner, 
the precautionary principle is ‘(…) a tool with ethical power and scientific rigor’.
62
 One way 
to motivate ‘(…) the public and policy-makers to take preventative action in the face of 
possible climate change’ is to raise public awareness of health impacts.’
63
 
According to Innovest, precaution is one of three fundamental principles, on which the 
evolving international policy framework should be based.
64
 A message for the industrial and 
the financial sector is that destructive impacts of climate change can have global implications 
and can affect any area of business activity negatively. While four out of five business leaders 
from the top 500 companies are aware of financial risks caused by climate change, only two 
out of five are taking relevant steps to hedge possible threats and to make use of potential 
opportunities.
65
 The main areas of business involvement are emission trading mechanisms 
and greater investments in clean power technology. In this respect, a wide array of actions are 
developed specifically for policy makers, market regulators, commercial bank managers, and 
other key decision makers.
66
 The main recommendations can be summed up as follows: 
(iv)Tradeoffs:  Many supporters are willing to countenance tradeoffs between a better 
environment and health on one side and wealth on the other side. Some supporters believe 
that developing countries need to make tradeoffs between growth and a cleaner environment. 
Others believe that developing countries have an opportunity to leapfrog developed countries 
in terms of adopting cleaner technologies as a basis for development. The notion of 
leapfrogging over old technologies may be the best way to make action on climate change 
palatable to developing countries. These countries are and will remain concerned primarily 
about economic growth. As Thomas Schelling wrote, ‘The Chinese, Indonesians, or 
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(v)Benefits of climate change:  Supporters and sceptics agree about localized benefits and 
that some regions may become richer due to increased yields of crops. Nevertheless, they are 
not convinced that these benefits will outweigh the costs for any country, and much less for 
the world as a whole. Ute Collier writes that some agricultural plants such as wheat, rice, and 
soy beans, so called C3 plants, can be shown to thrive on greater concentrations of CO2 in 
laboratory experiments. She cautions, however, that ‘(…) levels of temperature and 
precipitation are also crucial and combined effects may be negative in some areas. Also, 
some important crop plants (C4 species, such as maize, sorghum and sugar cane) are less 
responsive to higher CO2 levels and are likely to suffer from water shortages and increased 
soil parching in a warmer climate.’
68
 
4.  CLIMATE REALISTS 
Between climate change supporters and skeptics, there has been a tiny minority of analysts 
who are convinced of the urgency of the problem while remaining profoundly sceptical of the 
proposed solutions. Most of them are from developing countries and their voices have largely 
gone unheard.   
The data about emissions show (Fig 3) that developed countries (Annex 1) emit far 
more than that of developing countries (non-Annex 1).  Global emissions, on a per capita 
emissions,  increased from 0.01 metric tonnes in 1800 to 1.2 tonnes in 2005. Average per 
capita emissions were 8.4 tonnes of carbon dioxide in the EU-15 and 19.7 tonnes in USA. 
Despite their faster growth in emissions, developing countries such as those from Asia still 
emit a lot fewer emissions (on a per capita basis) than countries from Europe and North 
America.  Per capita emissions from China were 2.6 tonnes and for India the figure was 1.0 
tonnes. By 2050, emissions will start stabilizing for both Annex 1 as well as for non-Annex 1 
countries (IPCC 2007).   
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Figure 3: Per capita CO2 emissions by Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries 
 
For the developing countries, climate change issues are not the main concern when compared 
with problems such as poverty, natural resource management, energy and livelihood needs. 
From their perspective, development should come first, i.e., one should start from a 
sustainable development perspective which prioritises poverty reduction and equity. The 
challenge for such a type of development is the practical question of choosing sustainable 
pathways that provide food and energy security, employment opportunities and at the same 
time minimize environmental impacts. Hence, a less-polarised way of meeting the challenges 
of climate change is to build policies upon development priorities that are vitally important to 
developing countries. Such an approach views the risks of climate change not as a burden to 
be avoided, but as a side-benefit of sustainable development. And this could then lead to an 
alternative strategy for establishing cooperation between developing and developed nations. 
Such a strategy should involve efficient utilization of natural resources, increase in service 
levels, lower spending by the consumer on resource-related expenditure reduction and also 
reduction in air pollution levels. In this connection, energy efficiency and clean energy 
technologies can play a significant role which provide a net positive economic benefit ─ 
monetary, health, and environmental ─ to the society as a whole. Investments in energy 
efficiency result in long-term benefits such as reduced energy consumption, local 
environmental enhancement and overall economic development
69. Cost-effective energy 
efficiency is the ultimate multipollutant reduction strategy. Here we briefly describe various 
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win--win pathways for direct and indirect benefits under different types of projects and 
programmes aiming at spurring economic development and reducing the climate change 
impacts.  These “No-regrets options” have the potential to be welcomed by both skeptics and 
supporters as they provide the dual benefit of climate change mitigation and economic 
improvement. 
The concept of no-regrets can be considered as synonym for the concept of win-win. There 
are two types of no-regrets, respectively win-win outcomes: 
(i)The first type — economic win-win — is achieved when a problem is mitigated at a 
negative net economic cost, thus leading to a win for problem solving and a win for the 
economy.  
(ii)The second type — financial win-win — is achieved when a problem is mitigated at a 
profit (negative net financial cost), thus leading to a win for problem solving and a win 
for the particular investor, company, or industry.
70
 
The distinction between economic and financial cost is important, because the number of 
measures that are economically viable is probably higher than the number of measures that 
are financially profitable. This is because in a detailed economic analysis externalities are 
taken into account, whereas in a financial analysis they are not. Few doubts that there are the 
proverbial $100 bills waiting to be picked up from the street, but the question is whether there 
are sufficient viable business propositions to make it worthwhile for businesses to alter their 
course and start systematically searching for win-win opportunities. The essence of the theory 
of private capital mobilization (PCM) is that win-win opportunities can be created.
71
 In other 
words, if there are too few $100 bills on the street, it is possible to print them. Where there 
are such bills, but barriers too to get hold of them, it is possible to reduce, remove, or 
overcome these barriers. The key is to focus on those win-win opportunities that require only 
a small subsidy or intervention and that create large external benefits. 
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If we want to get businesses and financial institutions to be active participants in solving 
problems, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that their participation will be good for the 
economy or the society as a whole, but we have to show that it will improve the balance sheet 
of the particular organization concerned. If financial win-win situations can be created by 
mobilizing private capital, it is possible to strengthen the case against the argument that 
companies can not afford to take environmental action. 
Economic win-win situations contain activities that lead to positive environmental and 
developmental change. They do not involve significant tradeoffs between the environment 
and the economy. Economic effects, thereby, can have many different meanings such as 
GDP, number of jobs created, consumer benefits, business competitiveness, or average 
industry performance, and each researcher will have his or her own preference
72. 
Financial win-win opportunities combine profit and sustainability. In this way, win-win 
opportunities overcome asymmetrical interests that have often prevented effective problem 
solving. It is worth distinguishing between real win-win arrangements that involve a net 
positive pay-off for all stakeholders, and relative win-win arrangements, where some parties 
may have to pay something, but not as much as under alternative arrangements. The latter is 
the case, for example, if car manufacturers facing a costly carbon tax, see a requirement to 
increase sales of clean cars as preferable. 
There is another way to conceptualize the win-win issue by using a stakeholder 
perspective. From a narrow view of this approach, win-win outcomes are achieved if the 
participant benefits from a particular project. From a wider view, win-win outcomes are 
related on the distribution of benefits to all stakeholders, also to those that are not directly 
involved within a project. In an ideal scenario, the government will achieve its policy goals, 
such as for instance to reduce public expenditures, to improve the environment, or to protect 
disadvantaged social groups, firms and financial institutions will achieve their business 
objectives, such as for instance to make profits and to improve their reputation, and the civil 
society organizations will attain their aims, such as for instance to improve the environment, 
ensure democratic legitimacy, and prevent corruption. A win-win solution means to achieve 
those particular goals that the stakeholders define as such for themselves. These options 
should be looked at from various perspectives. 
4.1 Governmental perspective: This perspective looks at the net costs of the no-regret 
measures as  resource options based on the total costs to the government and the customer. 
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This perspective  includes national development goals, social equity, national priorities, self 
reliance, energy security, policy making, as well as institutions forming.  Power industry is a 
case in point. During the power plant connstruction land, energy, steel, concrete, as well as 
transportation facilities are required. During the operation, power plants use coal with 
significant ash content and emit CO2, SOx, NOx, etc., which pollute air, water and land.  
While pricing the electricity, we look at the capital and operating costs only and ignore these 
environmental and social costs.  If all these costs are included, the costs of energy generation 
through these conventional technologies will be high and are comparable with energy through 
renewables.  Another important issue is  energy security that has to be tackled by the 
government. Over the last three decades, we have witnessed events that have transformed the 
outlook for the global oil market. The first oil crisis of 1973, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
and the recent war on Iraq have resulted in sharp fluctuations in energy markets and 
reawaken concerns about energy security both for oil producers and consumers. Ensuring oil 
supply means being prepared to mitigate any short-term disruption of supply, and foster 
investment into a sustainable long-term supply. Mitigating short-term disruptions to oil 
supply involves use of oil stocks and emergency response measures, such as demand 
restraint, fuel switching, surge production. Securing reliable, competitive and 
environmentally sustainable long-term oil supply in the world is the responsibility of the 
government. Here,  the role of energy efficiency and the diffusion of renewable of energy 
technologies will be significant for a reliable and secured supply of energy. 
4.2 Business perspective: The relative novelty of the energy efficiency field together with its 
technical nature, and the invisibility of energy caused a lack of good information on energy 
efficiency technologies, their potentials, and costs.
73
 There are also other issues pertaining to 
the attitudes of the business establishment. They include the lack of recognition of non-
market needs of consumers, and the focus of the private sector on environmental remediation 
rather than pollution prevention. Leaving aside that business goals and the measurement of 
their successes are complex and a matter of debate, it can be safely assumed that businesses 
establishments are profit-seeking organizations. Energy efficiency involve efficient use of 
resources, which is key to industrial development. Industries not only prevent pollution but 
can also enhance profits by reducing energy and material use. They save the direct costs of 
these resources, as well as reducing disposal costs, avoiding fines, and minimizing bad 
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publicity. In addition, resource efficiency often enhances productivity, streamlines 
production, and improves workplace conditions. 
4.3 Society perspective:  Perhaps the most important, but least discussed and appreciated 
benefit of no regret options is the impact on local economies. Clearly, households, 
enterprises, and the government benefit directly by improving the efficiency of energy use. If 
they improve energy efficiency, they have more disposable income. However, there is an 
important net benefit to local economies, too. If expenditures on energy are reduced, the 
savings will improve the performance of the local economy via the ‘multiplier effect’ to the 
extent the savings are spent in the local economy. The multiplier effect is an economic 
phenomenon characteristic of all economies, relating the spending and re-spending effects of 
money on the output of local economies. Also, the expenditures on energy efficiency 
improvements themselves will improve local economic performance because the materials 
and labor for those improvements are likely to come from the local economy.  
 
Table 4: Benefits to individuals and society through energy efficiency – Indian scenario 
Service From  To  Investment 
     (Rs) 
Energy 
Saved 





WS-T (10%) WS-E(30%)       250     16.0  1000  1680.0 
WS-T (10%) Biogas    10000       19.4  1250  2520.0 
Cooking 
KS-T (30%)  LPG Stove      2000       2.3  300  226.2 
WS-T(10%)  WS-E (30%)       250      4.6  250  487.2 
WS-T (10%) Biogas     10000      5.7  320  840 
WS-T (10%) Solar Water 
Heater 








   15000       3.2  1780  627.5 
IB (60 W)   CFL        140     0.75  660  190 




 CFL        100      1.1  830  296 
Note: WS = Wood stove; T = Traditional; E = Efficient; IB = Incandescent Bulb, CFL = Compact 
Fluorescent Lamp 
Figures in parentheses are efficiencies of the devices 
 Table 4 provides the economic costs and benefits to an individual household as well 
as carbon emission benefits to the society through technology shifts.  As the table shows, a 
standard technology for cooking activity is replaced by an efficient one, the energy/per   28
family/per year will be saved to the tune of 50 to 300% depending on the type of technology 
that is being replaced.  With the reduction in energy consumption, the GHG emission 
reduction also will be achieved. The use of efficient devices demonstrates the advantages of 
climate benefits in terms of reducing the emissions levels as well as reducing the incremental 
costs. Thus, the cost and benefits of reducing a tonne of emissions in technological 
(inefficient to efficient) shifts might be more than a ton of emissions averted while shifting 
from one fuel to another (kerosene to LPG).  The estimates of carbon emission for lighting 
are indirect emissions due to the use of electricity generated mainly using coal. 
Table  5: Employment benefits due to energy efficiency in EU countries 






Net employment per 
million - government 
invested 
Fiscal, residential schemes       
France 71400  12.9 106.9
Germany -4200  -9.5 -31.7





France 81.7  11.5 11.5
Netherlands 3800  12 372.5
Spain 3344  50.7 265.4
UK 12260  98.1
Source:  Wade and Warren 2001.  
Energy efficiency investment can create significant employment opportunities too. 
Although providing employment was never a key aim of energy efficiency policy, the 
positive employment side effects of policies and programmes will prove to be useful in 
building support for energy efficiency investments across various governments. New jobs can 
be created especially in manufacturing and the construction sectors.  This is particularly the 
case where EE projects can demonstrate positive impacts for social groups currently 
disadvantaged in the employment market for example those with low skills and few 
qualifications, living in economically deprived areas. Joanne Wade and Andrew Warren, 
have co-authored a paper in which the employment impacts of energy efficiency investment 
programmes in nine EU Member States are discussed. Based on detailed case studies of 44   29
individual programmes and modelling of the wider effects, the study investigated short-and 
long-term impacts, both on total numbers of employed persons and on the skills mix utilized 
in the economy.  The results confirm that there are net employment gains in virtually all 





















Figure  5:  Recommendations for financial institutions and governments 
Source:  Adapted from Innovest 2002b, 37-43. 
It can be noted that these are total impacts over an extended time period up to a 
maximum of 30 years in some cases.  It is suggested that employment gains for fiscal and 
regulatory policies are of a similar magnitude to the findings of the case study approach. 
However, it is suggested that the case study approach underestimates the positive effects of 
institutional programmes such as EE initiatives.  The modelling results suggest a median 
employment gain of 29 person years per million whereas the case studies identified effects in 
Raise awareness 
Work together with key institutions (the media, professional bodies, industry 
associations) to promote a deeper understanding of climate change and to instil a 
commitment to action.  In order to be persuasive, the practical manifestations of 
climate change  should be highlighted, including profit impairment following 
abnormal weather, regulatory and market risks, commodity trading, and hedging 
techniques.
Lead by example  
Adopt a sustainability strategy for products and services in the public and private 
sector, addressing environmental and social risks, such as carbon liabilities, and 
seizing new opportunities, such as emission trading. Develop and implement 
energy efficiency measures and clean power applications. Institutions should 
examine the possibility of becoming carbon neutral in their operations. 
Get involved 
Become a participant in the design and implementation stages of GHG markets, 
products, and services. Apply the lessons of experience to fully comprehend the 




Establish a credit clearinghouse to improve market liquidity and to provide buyers 
and sellers with greater assurances that market positions can be adjusted at short 
notice. Expedite the formation of an index of prices for carbon to help overcome 
the high transaction costs and slow price discovery attached to GHG credits. Lobby 
for expedited project approval and credit transfer provisions, and for a liberal 




Structure deals to provide the maximum of specialized service with the minimum 
of transaction cost. Seek out ways to pool buyers and sellers of credits; bundle 
emission credits from the underlying projects and sell them separately; syndicate 
project risks among insurers and investors. Develop methods for monetizing 
broader sustainability benefits, such as generation and sale of biodiversity credits, 
water extraction rights, and the like. Take steps to incorporate a ‘cost of carbon’ 
into discounted cash flow analyses for GHG-intensive projects.   30
the range of 8-14 person years per million. This difference demonstrates the fact that a case 
study approach cannot reflect fully the positive economic stimulus caused by private — 
rather than government — investment. 
Finally we have to distinguish between win-win opportunities which are exploited and 
those which are latent. The first type are win-win opportunities, which do not require any 
intervention from governments, multilateral institutions, or other parties, because the private 
sector is aware of them and is exploiting them, already. As they are privately financed 
without special incentives already, there is no need to mobilize private capital. The second 
type of win-win opportunities are latent ones, Those may or may not be known to the private 
sector, and require a stimulus or some other form of intervention. The intervention may be 
regulatory, informational, financial, or a combination of these. The intervention may be 
economy-wide — affecting all firms and financial institutions — ,sector-wide, or targeted at 
particular companies and individuals. Any win-lose situation can be turned into a win-win 
situation by compensating the losers. 
5. MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICY 
All environmental policy instruments, including traditional command and control 
mechanisms, such as performance standards, and economic instruments, such as taxes and 
subsidies, can have an impact on private investment decisions. However, market-based 
measures have the greatest potential to attract profit-minded investors for climate change 
mitigation. The main idea of market-based mechanisms is to solve environmental problems in 
an economically efficient way by sending appropriate price signals to private investors to 
internalize the societal costs of their business decisions and to provide an economic incentive 
for firms to reduce those costs. 
Marked-based measures are sometimes favoured due to ideological reasons. For 
example, because of the belief that the government is not capable or efficient in providing 
solutions.
74
 However, markets require clear price signals and a legal framework. Therefore, 
market-based measures necessarily imply a role for the government. They would not thrive in 
an environment, entirely free of regulation, where the government does not provide clear 
rules and frameworking conditions.
75
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Warwick McKibbin and Peter Wilcoxen argue that mitigation policies, which do not 
minimize cost, are doomed to failure. For example, they propose coal market reform through 
reducing coal subsidies and trade barriers as a solution that will generate both economic and 
environmental benefits. Whilst price reform of this kind may disadvantage fossil fuel 
industries, the renewable energy sector can anticipate inflows of capital that would otherwise 
go to carbon-intensive industries. 
Apart from subsidy reform, trading emissions may be an instrument with the greatest 
potential in terms of climate change mitigation. The first emission trading schemes have been 
developed in the United States.
76
 The most well known programme is the sulphur dioxide 
trading scheme established at the beginning of the 1990s to tackle acid rain. This system 
enables firms to buy and sell rights to emit sulphur dioxide in a manner equivalent to buying 
and selling currencies in a foreign exchange market. The fact that it combines both 
environmental and economic benefits makes it attractive as a model for carbon trading 
systems. High penalties have prevented sources from violating the cap level – the maximum 
amount of allowable emissions. Indeed, since the acid rain programme commenced in 1995 
sources included into the scheme comply with their caps at lower costs than predicted at the 
time the programme was implemented. 
The experience has shown that the programme can ensure emission reductions at the 
least cost to society. This outcome should make it attractive even in the eyes of those who 
tend not to trust in market solutions. The programme is successful as the trade is beneficial 
for both, buyers and sellers. Sources that have a high cost of abatement can buy additional 
allowances at a lower price whilst sources that are able to reduce emissions below their cap 
are rewarded for better environmental performance by selling their extra allowances and 
making a profit. The total cost of reducing emissions through trading is smaller than that of 
other policy mechanisms. For instance, it was calculated that the Danish goal of 21 percent 
and the EU goal of 8 percent of GHG abatement would be achieved 9 and 24 times more 
costly by using taxation policy than with the use of emission trading.
77
 
With regard to pollution permit trading, there is a clear incentive for decreasing 
emissions, because there is a monetary value attached to allowances. Emission trading 
systems stimulate research and development, as the business sector can anticipate profitable 
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emissions abatement. Furthermore, emission trading systems provide high flexibility in 
choosing which type of emission reduction — including investment into abatement 
technology, fuel switch, energy efficiency measures, or utilization of renewable energy 
sources — is most suitable, In contrast, command and control approaches that, for example, 




In 2008, a new scheme will come into operation, which promises to become the 
largest emission trading market in the world. The European Union’s Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) would be applicable not only in the EU, but also in accession countries and 
the countries of the European Economic Area. The ETS is designed to contribute to the 
greenhouse gas reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The first emission trades 
have already been agreed to, indicating the interest of private sector actors. For example, 




A study undertaken by Enviros Consulting, which evaluated the UK carbon trading 
programme, concluded that the scheme provided local companies with the necessary 
experience to enter the EU-wide emission trading system and other international carbon 
markets. At the same time, the study questions the effectiveness of the programme in 
decreasing UK carbon emissions. However, the authors of the study hope that as the scheme 
matures it will contribute to the UK Kyoto target more significantly. To improve the 
operation of the programme, Enviros Consulting recommends to change voluntary 
enforcement mechanisms into mandatory ones.
80
 Another major instrument for climate 
change mitigation is environmental taxation. Several industrialized countries introduced taxes 
on the carbon content of oil, coal, and gas. This measure is designed to cut the use of carbon-
intensive fuels and increase the use of cleaner energy, thereby decreasing GHG emissions. In 
comparison to environmental taxes, emission trading may be more effective in terms of 
reaching an emission target, since it sets a strict emission goal. On the other hand, a tax may 
provide more up front certainty as to the cost of the programme, and it can be used in market 
segments where the establishment of an emission trading scheme is impractical or unwieldy. 
A mix of emission trading and environmental taxes may be the most effective approach in 
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many countries. The former instrument is better applicable to large polluters, while the latter 
better suits small polluters.
81
 
If an emission trading system is implemented at an international level, it could create 
strong demand for investment projects designed to reduce GHG emissions. Private capital 
could be mobilized through this mechanism because GHG reduction projects would yield 
credits that can be sold in the market. Firms that are able to reduce greenhouse gases at a 
price below the trading price can make a profit out of mitigating climate change. In this way, 
climate change could become the basis for a growing sector of business activity, ultimately 
developing into a major economic driving force in the coming decades. Specialists from 
Natsource, DZ Bank, and other organizations involved in climate change mitigation see a big 
advantage of a carbon market in that it will enable ‘(…) bringing future revenues from 
forward GHG contracts to the beginning of the project, rather than payments at the back end.’  
There are also critical voices concerning emission trading schemes.
82
 For example, 
Martin Tampier argues that the renewable energy sector will not be able to benefit from the 
ETS since renewables will not be covered. The only possibility for them to get involved is to 
offer renewable energy to those, who might wish to substitute for fossil fuel generation. 
Moreover, for many firms, paying the non-compliance penalty might be cheaper than 
reducing their emissions. A low penalty would encourage many firms to prefer non-
compliance rather than investing in more expensive clean technologies. Further, an emission 
trading scheme may not, in itself, be sufficient to achieve broader policy objectives such as 
renewable energy development. It is not clear if emission trading will help renewables to 
cover the gap between production costs and electricity prices, and thereby, to become more 
competitive with conventional fuels. However, the future may bring a decrease of renewable 




Currently energy efficiency projects may be better suited to take advantage of 
emission trading, while renewables could benefit from Joint Implementation. However, this 
assumption should be subject to further research. The Transnational Institute states that Joint 
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism favour implementation of large scale 
renewable energy projects since small ones have more difficulties in measuring and 
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identifying energy production. According to Bachram et al, ‘This undermines diversity and 
innovation in the renewable energy sector as a whole.’
84
 
In terms of actual policy developments currently under implementation, the 
development of a GHG trading system would be an essential component of a reform of 
incentive structures. If the effectiveness of such a system is not whittled down in negotiation, 
and if compromise does not result in the lowest common denominator, GHG trading has the 
potential to mobilize large sums of private capital, especially if combined with carbon taxes 
and other policy instruments. The question is how to make these ideas working in practice. In 
order to make GHG markets operate efficiently, the main tasks include producing demand, 
enhancing buyer confidence in pricing, bringing greater liquidity to the GHG market, 
overcoming the short-term cash flow problems, and creating larger economies of scale.
85
 
The main task for private investors is to calculate the effects of GHG regulations and 
carbon price sensitivities into the analysis of project economics.
86
 The interest of investors 
will increase if it can be shown that technologies become cheaper as a result of 
commercialization and that GHG emission markets offer opportunities to create profits from 
project cash flows and advisory fees. The alternative to voluntary action on climate change 
are higher taxes and stricter environmental regulations, as well as higher indirect costs due to 
environmental and health damages which ultimately are paid by households and firms. An 
important advantage of GHG trading is that it includes incentives based on self-interest, such 
as for instance, direct profit opportunities for firms which can reduce pollution at less than the 
trading price. Thus, GHG trading is not favoured by arguments about enlightened self-
interest, although these arguments may be important to long-term profits and business 
competitiveness. 
Market-based mechanisms should not be treated as a panacea for solving 
environmental problems, since there are cases, which require complementary mechanisms 
including economic instruments and command-and-control approaches. However, market-
based provisions should be further investigated and exploited when they offer advantages. 
The US sulphur trading programme has shown that market-based approaches can be cost 
effective in mobilizing private capital for clean technologies, which gives ground for 
optimism concerning carbon trading schemes. Using a mix of measures, climate change 
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6. DISCUSSION – DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERPSECTIVES 
 
The impacts of climate change can be reduced if a transition is made from supply 
obsessed planning to focussing on demand side management and renewable energy 
programms. The driving forces for the promotion of such a sustainable energy path may shift 
increasingly from regulation to opportunity.  While for a long time businesses adopted 
strategies of avoidance and outright resistance, in recent years an increasing number of them 
have begun to explore the profit potential of clean energy technologies. Oil giants redefined 
themselves as energy companies and, together with a host of engineering and technology 
companies, increased their exposure to clean energy technology.  
The more win-win opportunities exist, the cheaper is it to achieve economic and 
social development. In fact, as long as win-win opportunities are exploited, achieving 
economic development and at the same time mitigating climate change are economically and 
financially viable. However, although win-win opportunities are profitable, this does not 
necessarily mean that they are privately financed and that there is no need to mobilize 
government capital. Due to a variety of barriers, the private sector cannot take advantage of 
all profit opportunities. Since it is unlikely that all profit opportunities have been recognized 
and exploited, traditional policy options and market-based measures can enable profit-minded 
investors to take advantage of environmental business opportunities. If win-win opportunities 
are sizeable, the question is how to realize them cost effectively and make them 
commercially self-sustaining over time. This question merits further attention by policy 
makers and the business community (Figure 6).  In the absence of demonstrated linkages 
between different sectors,  the technology options are given a superficial treatment by policy-
makers.  To illustrate an example, access to electricity and subsidised kerosene is justified 
from the perspective of reduced  forest loss. Reduced expenditure on health and retention of a 
healthy and productive community is seldom quantified. Policy-makers would provide 
increased budgets for rural health care without considering a complementary budget for the 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies or electrification programs. This does not 
demonstrate poor performance on the part of policymakers but highlights the need for a pool 
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of skills and resources for assisting policy-makers in justifying decisions taken in the process 













Figure 6. Cost Benefit of a Cleaner Technology Project 
 
In short, economic prosperity, human development and environmental benefits 
should move hand in hand. Conversely, high-energy use places an enormous burden on 
long-term economic development and poses critical problems to improving living 
standards, particularly those from the developing countries. Energy inefficiency becomes a 
drain on factories, machinery, and resources, affecting competitiveness.  Hence it is 
important to invest  in the efficiency of the energy supply systems and reduce losses on the 
demand side. However, it is a matter of disagreement how many opportunities are available, 
and what percentage of an environmental target can be achieved with efficient technologies 
and win-win options. Nonetheless, it can be safely argued that that there are plenty of these 
no-regrets opportunities, and that development can be achieved through these options and 




From the perspective of developing countries, international agencies, such as the 
United Nations have not adequately addressed their priorities for sustainable development.  
These agencies provide policy advice to the developing countries to focus on climate change 
issues as top priority since it might be difficult to implement them in many developed 
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countries which are the real culprits. This is unfair to make the developing countries repay the 
environmental debt of the developed world.  For the developing countries, climate change 
issues are not the main concern when compared with problems such as poverty, natural 
resource management, energy and livelihood needs.  It may often be possible to build 
environmental and climate policy around development priorities that are vitally important 
from the developing country perspective. The climate change benefits will eventually come 
as a result of implementing these policies. In such a scenario climate change policies may be 
seen not as a burden to be avoided but rather as a attendant benefit of sound and environment 
friendly development projects and programmes. 
  In the interest of global sustainability and moving on to environmentally more 
desirable paths, the concept of economic and social development should be the top priority 
for developing countries.  This means that climate change issue must be viewed through the 
lens of human development. The challenge for such a type of development is the practical 
question of choosing sustainable pathways that provide food and energy security, 
employment opportunities and at the same time minimize environmental impacts. Instead of 
focusing attention on policies to reduce climate change risks, the starting point should be the 
development issues that are vital to the economic development and how this can be achieved 
in an environment-friendly manner. This means that environmental policies should be derived 
from development priorities. This needs a conceptual framework that places sustainable 
human development before climate change by reversing the existing framework. For that one 
has to find out alternative and cleaner pathways to achieve sustainable development goals 
that can also contribute to climate change goals. To achieve this objective one has to reframe 
the global climate change debate as deriving from and complementing development priorities 
which can be approached on multiple levels and from various perspectives and should take 
into consideration the rapid economic growth to be achieved by developing countries. There 
is also the need to build scientific and technical capacity, advancing scientific knowledge, 
and linking economic, social, technological and policy making. This “reversal thinking” 
should map development, equity and vulnerability on to the greenhouse gas emission 
problem. The determinants of this include financial resources, technology, and importantly 
the availability of trained persons to use them effectively. Access to information and 
institutional mechanism (legal, social, etc.) is also important 
For developing countries, climate change remains marginal to the pressing issues of 
poverty, natural resource management, food security, energy needs and access to modern 
transport or land use that takes into consideration development, equity and vulnerability and   38
capture the attention of leading stakeholders.  Presently, the cooperation efforts and analyses 
of climate change policies have been driven uniquely by concerns of the developed countries. 
From this perspective, related ancillary benefits in energy efficiency, and health impacts of 
local air pollution may be significant and promote actions, but they are only of secondary 
importance in that they may reduce the total costs of compliance with climate change 
commitments. Such an approach will have limited success in developing countries. The 
challenge then is to have an integrated development and environmental policies so that the 
developing countries can stay on the paths that minimize the local and global environmental 
costs of relieving poverty, providing adequate food, getting electricity to households and 
industry, providing employment and transportation facilities consistent with the needs of 
developing country people.  It may not be easy to reframe global environmental policies as 
deriving from development priorities and solve the climate change problem.  However, this 
new framework suggests that global collaboration on climate change should be approached at 
multiple levels through local and national development projects, as well as through 
multilateral efforts to establish cooperation mechanisms within an equitable and efficient 
global climate change regime. 
  According to this approach, a less-polarized way of meeting the challenges of 
sustainable development and climate change is necessary to build environmental and climate 
policy upon development priorities that are crucial to the billions of people form the 
developing world. For example, international financiers are expected to prioritize projects 
that have a low financial cost per unit of GHG emission reduction, while national 
stakeholders are keen on national benefits of the activity in the form of employment 
generation, social development, and local environmental improvements.  Following that, it 
will be relevant to measure multiple financial, economic, social and environmental benefits of 
mitigation policies and then negotiation can take place between national stakeholders and 
international financiers to develop a portfolio of policy options that balance sustainable 
development and climate change policy priorities. Another issue is the issue of generalized 
methodologies. The parameters that are included in the models vary significantly by nation 
and region, and with time. Hence, it is important to develop localized models of 
environmental impacts, population exposure, preferences and valuation. This type of 
methodology is useful in understanding synergies and tradeoffs between global and local 
environmental policies.  Research is required on inter-linkages between sustainable 
development and climate change policies.   39
  Adaptation and mitigation strategies have to be developed for sectors such as energy, 
transport, land use, industry and waste and see how such plans can be implemented in 
practice. In many countries, energy initiatives and other climate-favouring activities emerge 
as additional benefits of sound development programmes. Price reform, agricultural soil 
protection, sustainable forestry, energy sector restructuring are being undertaken without any 
reference to climate change. These initiatives help in mitigating environmental risks and at 
the same time they enhance economic and social development. 
  However, a number of barriers ─ technical, financial and capacity ─ exist for 
implementing these initiatives
89
. Barrier removal is an essential part of technology transfer 
and efficiency improvement. In this regard, public sector participation in technology 
diffusion should be seen as a way of obtaining economic, environmental and social benefits 
of clean technologies since private sector cannot be expected to bear the full transaction cost 
for barrier removal. To achieve this policy-makers need to design appropriate policy 
measures to promote cleaner technologies.  There are also chicken and egg problems facing 
energy efficiency and renewable energy technology (RET) markets. On one hand, the capital 
markets will not finance RET projects in the absence of a sufficient volume. On the other 
hand, the market for RET projects will not develop to be of a sufficient volume in the absence 
of adequate financing.  Such issues have to be addressed. An innovative financial, 
institutional and implementational  mechanisms is needed that can support such integrated 
objectives.   
7. EPILOGUE  
There is a need for using sustainable development as a framework for climate change 
policies.  Regarding the principle of sustainable development, creating a  system and making 
it acceptable to all is of paramount importance.  This creates a huge ethical problem. A rich 
person in a developed country can complain bitterly about the way poor countries are 
allowing their environment to be destroyed by economic development.  On the contrary, a 
poor person in a developing country, ever doubtful about getting food, health care, education, 
would leap with joy at any improvement in the situation, and would not care for any 
environmental damage unless it affects his livelihood. How do we balance short-term 
benefits to the population with the long-term interests of preserving the environment?  In 
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such a situation, the framework that is developed should reflect the needs of developing 
countries and provide a constructive basis for combining the policies of local development 
and global climate change. For the implementation of such a framework the international 
climate change policies should be linked to sustainable development. There is also a need for 
a more systematic assessment of various institutions, market instruments and regulatory 
frameworks that can be used to support the implementation of these policies.   
  A goal to "stabilise world climate” is misplaced, not to mention its unattainable 
nature.  Climate is a dynamic system within which extreme events and dramatic changes will 
always occur, irrespective of human actions or preferences. It is widely agreed that the 
climate is changing but its future trajectory and impacts on the environment and society 
remain uncertain.
90
 There can be little doubt ‘(…) that man is capable of influencing the 
climate through human activities of many different kinds.’
91 Although a matter of some 
debate with regard to the data reliability, the curve of the global mean temperature has been 
rising since 1861 and although no single explanation for global warming can be given the 
greenhouse effect is a plausible one. This effect is attributed to the greenhouse gases CO2, 
CH4, N2, O, O3 and FCCs.
92 
  The clash between sceptics and supporters is likely to endure, and may even become 
more pitched as the stakes on climate change are raised. The expansion of scientific 
knowledge is unlikely to end the debate, as each side will get more data to confirm their case. 
Sceptics will continue to assail supporters for blending science with environmental activism, 
and supporters will maintain their doubts about the scientific credibility of sceptics, because 
of their links to economic interests. 
  Regardless of who is right in this debate, each side is valuable to the other. A vocal 
group of contrarians is necessary to achieve scientific progress, since it forces supporters to 
improve their science and vice versa. It is necessary to point out the flaws in assumptions, 
logic, and method, and to propose counter-arguments for every argument. The problem is not 
the scientific controversy, but the way in which science is used by economic and political 
interests, and the risk that scientists become pawns in a high- stakes political game.  
  Development may well be a better strategy for reducing the impacts of climate change 
than focusing on greenhouse gas emission reduction. Developing countries, with less ability 
                                                 
90
 Santamouris 2001, 22; Heal and Kriström 2002, 3. 
91
 Santamouris 2001, 19. 
92
 Santamouris 2001, 25.   41
to prosper, afford and use new technologies, have higher rates of hunger; poorer public health 
services; greater incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases; less access to education, safe 
water or sanitation; and, therefore, greater mortality rates and lower life expectancies.  It is a 
proven fact that there are a large number of `no-regret options’ waiting to be exploited. These 
options have the potential to be welcomed by skeptics, supporters as well as neutral observers 
as they provide the dual benefit of economic improvement of the masses and climate change 
mitigation, a concept of win−win situation.  Hence the resources that are spent on emission 
reduction for the sake of avoiding impacts are better spent on vulnerability reduction in 
developing countries. This approach would enhance societies’ abilities to cope not only with 
climate change but adversity in general, regardless of its cause, or whether it’s man-made or 
not.  Such a multifaceted and holistic approach would help to improve the lives of people 
living in poverty, without compromising the ability to address future challenges, whether 
caused by climate change, or something else entirely. 
  To compare the two strategies to reduce the impact of climate change, one has to 
address the tradeoffs between environmental protection and development in general, or even 
between emission reduction and development aid.  In a narrow sense, cutting emissions helps 
alleviating malaria and water shortage. In a broader sense, the same money can be spent 
differently to alleviate malaria and water shortage even more. Only by considering the 
broader question can we decide how much effort should be expended on development, 
thereby on greenhouse gas emission abatement. 
  The climate negotiations will succeed only if developing countries are driven by 
development priorities, and if there are countries or groups of countries among them willing 
to take a leadership role to push the process forward.  In the absence of leadership, even well-
intentioned players remain uncoordinated, which increases the transaction costs. Hence, the 
issue of climate change should be approached at multiple levels through local and national 
development projects, as well as through multilateral efforts to establish cooperation 
mechanisms within an equitable and efficient sustainable development regime. 
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